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After the Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2008, the Federal Reserve and the federal 
government used monetary and fiscal policy to buoy the economy out of the recession, 
but the Fed had to turn to non-standard forms of monetary policy, or unconventional 
monetary policy. The Federal Reserve used forward guidance, quantitative easing, and 
the maturity extension program to: lower interest rates, raise inflation expectations, and 
increase GDP. Six years after the Financial Crisis, the Federal Reserve has begun to taper 
from unconventional monetary policy. Yet, there has been much debate as to whether 
unconventional monetary policy is effective or not, and whether the Federal Reserve used 
these policies for “too” long.  
This paper argues that debt overhang is preventing unconventional monetary 
policy from being effective. Debt overhang is a debt burden that is so great that an entity 
cannot take on additional debt to finance future projects. For instance, when the housing 
bubble burst, home values dropped below the mortgage value leaving individuals with 
less equity, even negative equity, contributing to debt overhang. Through regression and 
graphical analysis, the results indicate that unconventional monetary policy stimulates 
investment and consumption, while debt overhang has a significant impact on investment 
and consumption. Therefore, the low interest rate environment that the unconventional 
monetary policy creates is not stimulating investment and consumption because market 
participants are trying to save money.  
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 Introduction  
 
 Although the tapering of quantitative easing began in December 2013, the Federal 
Reserve is still using unconventional monetary policies. On January 28, 2015, the Federal 
Reserve noticed that labor markets have been strong and investments have been 
increasing. However, the FOMC also stated, “The committee continues to see the risks to 
the outlook for economic activity and the labor market as nearly balanced.”1 This means 
that they expect inflation to decline further in the near term. Consequently, the Federal 
Reserve maintained that it continues to target interest rates at 0 to a ¼ percent and 
holding of agency debt, mortgage-backed securities, and Treasury securities at auction 
until inflation climbs up to two percent.  
Nevertheless, why, after six years since the Great Recession, is the Federal 
Reserve still not taking its foot completely off the pedal of unconventional monetary 
policy? At the Senate Banking Committee, Janet Yellen stated, “There has been 
important progress. However, despite this improvement, too many Americans remain 
unemployed or underemployed, wage growth is still sluggish and inflation remains well 
below our longer-run objective.”2 This paper argues that debt overhang constrains many 
Americans from being able to participate in normal consumption and investment 
behavior, resulting in a slow economic recovery. Thus, while the Federal Reserve 
                                                
1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. FOMC. Press Release. FRB: --FOMC Statement—
January 28, 2015. <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071212a.htm>.  
2 Applebaum, Bynyamin. "Fed’s Janet Yellen, in Testimony, Counsels Patience on Interest Rate Increase." 
The New York Times, February 24, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/25/business/economy/fed-
chief-yellen-testifies-before-congress.html?_r=0. 
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continues to implement unconventional monetary policy, debt overhang prevents this 
policy from being effective.  
Debt overhang is a term used to describe a debt burden that is so great, an entity 
cannot take on additional debt to finance future projects. Debt overhang is measured in 
one of two ways: a ratio of   !"#$!"#$%& or a ratio !!"  !""#$"!"#$%& .  After the financial crisis, there 
were serious changes to individuals’ balance sheets, due to a multitude of events. In the 
years before the crisis, there was a flood of irresponsible mortgage lending in America. 
Loans were lent out to “subprime” borrowers with poor credit histories who struggled to 
repay their loans. These risky mortgages were passed on to financial engineers at big 
banks, who put these mortgages together in pools masked them as low-risk, high yielding 
securities, and then sold them to investors. However, these high yielding, supposedly 
“safe assets,” like mortgage-backed securities, were not stable investments. In 2006, 
when home values dropped, people could no longer pay their mortgages, so mortgage-
backed securities dropped in value, and safe CDOs became worthless, despite the ratings 
agencies’ seal of approval. As a result, complex chains of debt between counterparties 
spread and Americans and financial institutions were left with huge amounts of debt.  
Conventional monetary and fiscal policies were implemented in mid- 2007 and 
2008 to buoy the sinking ship of the American economy. The fiscal efforts to end the 
recession and jump-start the recovery were built around a series of stimulus measures. 
First, income tax rebate checks were mailed to households in early 2008 to increase 
Americans’ disposable income. Then, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 was enacted in response to the subprime mortgage crisis. Within this legislation was 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which authorized the United States Secretary 
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of Treasury to spend up to $700 billion on distressed assets, such as mortgage-backed 
securities, and supply cash directly to the banks. The funds to purchase distressed assets 
were mostly redirected to inject capital into banks and other financial institutions, while 
the Treasury continued to examine the usefulness of targeted asset purchases. Next, the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) passed in early 2009. The economic 
stimulus package with an estimated cost of $787 billion was later revised to be $831 
billion between 2009 and 2011. The Act included direct spending in infrastructure, 
education, health, energy, federal tax incentives, and expansion of unemployment 
benefits and other social welfare provisions.3 
In conjunction with fiscal efforts, the Fed lowered interest rates aggressively in 
2008 to decrease interest rates, increase GDP, and decrease unemployment rates. 
However, by adopting a near-zero interest rate policy in 2008, there was a liquidity trap, 
where monetary policy was not translating to increased price level. Therefore, the Fed 
had to implement nonstandard forms of monetary policy to fulfill their goals. The Fed’s 
policies were broken down as such: first, the communication policies using forward 
guidance gave people confidence in the economy. Second, the Fed increased the size and 
the composition of its balance sheet. This has been done by large-scale asset purchases, 
referred to as quantitative easing, of Treasury securities, agency debt securities, and 
agency mortgage-backed securities. Lastly, through the Fed’s “Maturity Extension 
Program,” the central bank was able to purchase $667 billion in long-term U.S. treasury 
securities and sell an equivalent amount of short-term Treasury securities. Table 1 
indicates the various rounds of unconventional monetary policy.  
                                                
3 "Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic 
Output from October 2011 Through December 2011." CBO, 2012. 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/02-22-ARRA.pdf. 
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Table 1: Implementation of Unconventional Monetary Policy





1.1 The Federal Reserve Unconventional Actions  
 These policies were used before in the U.S., although not to the same degree as 
the recent crisis, economic literature has found that unconventional monetary policies are 
effective in times of economic crisis. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) point out that when a 
central bank can no longer stimulate aggregate demand by further interest-rate reductions, 
the central bank must rely on “nonstandard” policy alternatives, or unconventional 
monetary policy. They discovered that these policies affect asset prices and yields, and as 
a result increase aggregate demand. Ultimately, the theories that Bernanke and Reinhart 
analyzed in their 2004 paper, led Bernanke to implement these policies in 2008.  
 As chairman of the Federal Reserve, Bernanke was concerned with providing 
liquidity to the economy, to ensure that GDP would grow, and unemployment rates 
would decline. Gambacorta, Hofmann, and Peersman (2013) found significant results 
with the implementation of unconventional monetary policy. They found that when 
expansionary unconventional monetary policy is applied, there is a substantial, and 
temporary rise in economic output and prices. To increase output and prices, it was 
important for the Federal Reserve to decrease interest rates to stimulate this output. In 
particular, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) examined the effects of 
quantitative easing on lowered interest rates, which influenced preferences for safer 
assets, higher expectations of inflation, and lower corporate bond risk  
 Aside from just using quantitative easing (QE) as a way to influence 
macroeconomic behavior, the FOMC forward guidance was also a beneficial tool for the 
Federal Reserve to use. Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012) empirically 
illustrated that FOMC policy announcements substantially decrease Treasury bond rates, 
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increase corporate borrowing rates, and influence private macroeconomic forecasts. Thus, 
forward guidance is a great tool for the Federal Reserve to use, in addition to quantitative 
easing.  
Although financial institutions were stabilized and some positive outcomes 
affected the economy, literature suggests that unconventional monetary policy was not 
fully effective. These policies seemed to have lost steam around 2010 and 2011. Putnam 
(2013) states that the Fed’s QE programs from 2011 onward did little to nothing in 
assisting the U.S. economy. He found that economic growth remains constrained because 
the shock of the earlier financial panic left long-lasting changes to risk preferences. Thus, 
it is because of these negative signals that economic confidence has been diminished.   
Labonte (2014) argues that the sluggish rate of economic recovery raises 
questions about the optimal approach to monetary policy. Labonte suggests that monetary 
policy alone is not powerful enough to return the economy to full employment after a 
severe financial crisis. Labonte specifically argues that the Fed continued to pursue these 
policies in spite of modest improvements, such that inflation has increased, but has not 
reached its two percent target. Friedman (2014) also argues that fiscal policy was not 
fully utilized after the financial crisis, which could have stimulated jobs and wage growth 
more quickly. Friedman (2014) and Labonte (2014) both agree that unconventional 
monetary policy has led to above-average growth in the money supply, posing a threat to 
price stability in the future.  
1.2 The Aftermath of Debt Overhang  
 Additional literature has suggested that because of debt overhang; the Federal 
Reserve did not need to pump liquidity into financial markets for six years. Martin Wolf 
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(2014) explains that there is a misconception of what type of crisis erupted in 2008. The 
economists identified the financial crisis with old-fashioned bank runs by depositors. 
Instead, the crisis was not a crisis of confidence, but a crisis of indebtedness. In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, Paul Krugman (2009) explains more explicitly how 
recovery is bound to be a prolonged process. He states that the global credit system is in a 
state of paralysis and two things need to be addressed. The first is that credit needs to be 
flowing and the second is that spending needs to be stimulated. Credit has been flowing 
due to the Fed pumping liquidity into the economy, but to increase consumer spending, 
more needs to be done. Krugman stresses the importance of very large fiscal stimuli, 
insisting that infrastructure, healthcare, education, and autos are big enough to 
overwhelm systemic and psychological depression. 
 Boshara and Emmons (2013) discuss how the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009 
was damaging to household balance sheets. In particular, they examined the importance 
of sound financial footing to families at the micro-level and the importance of healthy 
household balance sheets to the economy. The lack of savings and assets can hurt future 
consumption and security. They consider the huge declines in asset values and net worth 
as one of the shocks that threw the economy into a recession. In addition, the liability side 
of household balance sheets could be a future detriment to the economy, in regards to 
default and deleveraging.  
 This paper will thus tie together unconventional monetary policy and debt 
overhang, and discuss their relationship after the financial crisis. Ultimately, if debt 
overhang is preventing nonstandard forms of monetary policy from being effective. The 
next chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature on the effectiveness of 
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unconventional monetary policy and the effects of debt and deleveraging. The third 
chapter is an analytical framework of debt overhang, unconventional monetary policy, 
and fiscal policy. The fourth chapter examines the relationship between unconventional 
monetary policy and debt overhang, through the graphical and regression analysis of this 
relationship. The fifth and final chapter concludes the study and discusses how 



















 Literature Review 
 This chapter outlines the literature discussing unconventional monetary policy 
and debt overhang. However, before the relationship between unconventional monetary 
policy and debt overhang can be explained, it is imperative to note how central banks 
orchestrate monetary policy. The first section, Conventional Monetary Policy, explains 
how a central bank determines the size and the rate of growth of the money supply, which 
in turn affects interest rates to either stimulate GDP or slow down inflation. The second 
section, Unconventional Monetary Policy Fundamentals, discusses the various ways that 
make unconventional monetary policy effective. In addition, this section will discuss the 
weaknesses of these policy instruments. The third and final section, The Ties Between 
Debt Overhang and Unconventional Monetary Policy, explains the role that debt and 
debt overhang play in the financial crisis, both before and after. 
2.1 Conventional Monetary Policy  
There are two channels in which monetary policy is executed, one is through 
instruments and the other is through monetary targets. Instrument tools are tools used by 
the central bank to adjust price or quantity to affect GDP, unemployment, and inflation; 
while monetary targets are assigned variables by the central bank that they cannot set 
directly, but over time can exert substantial influence over the economy.  
 Friedman (1988) details how the instruments and targets of monetary policy affect 
the economy in direct and indirect ways. For example, instruments of monetary policy 
include: the reserve requirements or portions of deposits that banks must maintain, either 
in their vaults or on deposit, at a Federal Reserve Bank; open market operations which 
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varies the supply of such reserves through buying and selling securities; the discount rate, 
which is the interest rate charged by the Federal Reserve to depository institutions on 
short term loans; lending reserves directly to banks; and/or regulating aspects of banking 
and financial activities. These policies influence interest rates and money supply, which 
in turn affects the economy. For example, expansionary open market operations can 
affect aggregate demand and supply during periods of recession. For instance, when the 
Fed buys Treasury bonds it increases the money supply. This shifts the demand for bonds 
and raises the price of bonds, reducing the interest rate. The lower interest rate stimulates 
investment, reduces the demand for and increases the supply of dollars in the currency 
market. The combined impact of greater investment and net exports will shift the 
aggregate demand curve to the right. This example of open market operations is 
illustrated in Appendix A to show how interest rates and the money supply affect output 
and price level.  
 In addition to instruments, targets of monetary policy are used when the central 
banks use the liability side of the balance sheet, like bank reserves, the monetary base, 
and currency, to indirectly affect the economy over a certain horizon of time. This 
influences other factors that affect GDP, unemployment and inflation. For instance, when 
an expansion in the monetary base gives financial institutions the ability to loan out more 
money, this indirectly stimulates investment because the commercial banks’ willingness 
to lend should increase individuals’ willingness to invest. Friedman states, “This 
realization of the intermediate target is then part of the information set underlying the 
choice of a final value for the policy instrument.” Thus, these monetary policy tools are 
useful when other policy actions take too long to affect economic behavior. The next 
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section highlights the needs for non-standard forms of monetary policy when the Federal 
Reserve cannot decrease interest rates anymore through its normal tools.  
2.2 Unconventional Monetary Policy Fundamentals 
 Before Ben Bernanke became Chairman of the Federal Reserve, he published 
numerous academic articles. Bernanke’s particular interest was in the economic and 
political events of the Great Depression. Much of his work is inspired by the monetarist 
theory of Milton Friedman. Friedman rejected the use of fiscal policy as a tool of demand 
management.4 He wrote extensively on the Great Depression, or as he called it, the Great 
Contraction. Friedman argued that it had been caused by an ordinary financial shock 
whose duration and seriousness were greatly increased by the subsequent contraction of 
the money supply.  
Due to the misguided policies of the directors of the Federal Reserve, the Fed was 
tightening and depriving banks of liquidity, where it instead should have loosened and 
pumped money into the system. For example, Friedman and his colleague, Anna 
Schwartz, noted that one of the first stages of contraction had severe implications on the 
economy. From the spring of 1928 to the crash of October 1929, the Fed raised the 
discount rate and decreased the holdings of government securities. This tightening of 
policy, although intended to put an end to stock market speculation, was inevitably 
followed by falling prices and weaker economic activity. From the cyclical peak in 
August 1929 to the crash in October 1929—production, wholesale prices, and personal 
income fell at an annual rate of 20 percent, 7.5 percent, and 5 percent, respectively.5 
Friedman maintained that monetary mechanics are very important to stabilize the 
                                                
4 "Milton Friedman (1912-2006)." The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Liberty Fund. 
5 Bernanke, Ben. "On Milton Friedman's Ninetieth Birthday." Speech, At the Conference to Honor Milton 
Friedman from The Federal Reserve Board , Chicago , November 8, 2002. 
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economy, and keep people afloat in an economic crisis. As Ben Bernanke stated on 
Friedman’s ninetieth birthday, “I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the 
Great Depression. You’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't 
do it again.”     
Therefore, in a crisis like the Great Depression, monetary policy is an important 
foundational instrument to stabilize the economy. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) also 
point out that when a central bank can no longer stimulate aggregate demand by further 
interest-rate reductions, the central bank must rely on “nonstandard” policy alternatives, 
or unconventional monetary policy. They examined how implementing communication 
policies leveraged the effectiveness of other unconventional monetary policies, like the 
size and change in the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet through the 
targeted purchases of long-term bonds as a means of reducing the long-term interest rate. 
All of these factors were used to shape public expectations about the future course of 
interest rates. For instance, lower interest rates keep individuals investing and consuming 
goods and services. At the time of this publication, they looked at three recent episodes of 
economic crisis in the U.S. and Japan to provide important insight on the potential 
effectiveness of various nonstandard policies. They discovered that these policies may 
affect asset prices and yields, and consequently, aggregate demand.  
They noted that these policies used in the U.S. were significantly effective for 
their intended outcomes. For instance, quantitative easing was used in the debt buybacks 
of late 1990s, the massive purchase of U.S. Treasury securities between 2000 and 2003, 
and the Fed’s target purchases of U.S. Treasuries as an anti-deflationary measure in 2003. 
The event-study analyses of these episodes, as well as the comparison of actual Treasury 
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yields during these periods, suggest that large changes in the relative supplies of 
securities have significant effects on their yields. Most importantly, they found that 
shaping investor expectations through the Federal Reserve’s communication is an 
effective strategy in persuading the public that the policy rate will remain low for a 
longer period of time. Central bankers thus can reduce long-term rates and can increase 
activity in the economy. Figure 1 shows the intended effects of unconventional monetary 
policy to increase investment, consumption, and exports, which ultimately increase 
output growth, inflation, and wages.  
Figure 1: Transmission Mechanism of Unconventional Monetary Policy 
Source: World Economic Forum 
After analyzing economic theory and adhering to Milton Friedman’s ideology, 
Bernanke implemented unconventional monetary policies in 2008. Gambacorta, 
Hofmann, and Peersman (2013) also found significant results with the implementation of 
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unconventional monetary policy. After, central banks exhausted their conventional 
methods, interest rates reached the zero-lower bound. Gambacorta, et al were interested 
in the effects of unconventional monetary methods during the crisis period. They found 
that when expansionary unconventional monetary policy is applied, there is a substantial, 
temporary rise in economic output and prices. These results suggest that the 
unconventional monetary policy measures adopted by central banks in the wake of the 
global financial crisis provide temporary support to their economies.  
In particular, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) examined the 
elements of quantitative easing (QE), and specifically, the effects of purchasing various 
long term Treasuries and bonds on interest rates. They explained that the Fed’s success is 
based on many facets. The first is large asset purchases, which signal that the Fed will be 
involved in supporting the economy for an extended period of time. The second is to 
change investor preferences from long-term duration to short-term duration, by 
decreasing long-term yields, investing in more liquid assets, and investing in safer assets. 
The third is to decrease default and risk premium and to increase inflation expectation. 
With these measurements, they were able to inspect if QE was effective.  
 Their results reveal particular details about each round of QE. They found that 
QE1 involved large purchases of agency mortgage-backed securities, which reduced the 
price of mortgage-specific risk. While QE2 involved only Treasury purchases and left a 
substantial decrease on Treasury and Agency bond rates, as well as had smaller effects on 
mortgage-backed security rates and corporate rates. QE1 affected the equilibrium price 
for mortgage-specific risk and decreased the default and risk premium for corporate 
bonds contributing to lower corporate rates. Ultimately, yields on medium and long 
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maturity safe bonds fell because of demand for safe nominal assets. The Fed purchases of 
mortgage-backed securities reduced the supply of such assets and thus increased the 
equilibrium of safety-premium. Yet both QE1 and QE2, with evidence from inflation 
swap rates and IPS, increased inflation expectations; thus QE was effective in reducing 
interest rates, lowering risk, changing investing behavior, and raising inflation 
expectation.  
Another implementation of unconventional monetary policy is the FOMC public 
statements, or forward guidance, which can “substitute for lower interest rates at the zero 
lower bound.”6 Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano (2012) empirically illustrate the 
responses of asset prices and private macroeconomic forecasts to FOMC forward 
guidance, both prior to and since the recent financial crisis. Their results indicate that the 
FOMC has extensive experience successfully forecasting its intended adjustments to 
evolving macroeconomic conditions, thereby providing additional policy 
accommodation. For example, they show that surprises associated with FOMC policy 
announcements substantially influence Treasury bond rates, corporate borrowing rates, 
and private macroeconomic forecasts. Yet, news of substantial monetary tightening raises 
interest rates as expected, while also raising inflation forecasts and lowering 
unemployment forecasts. Thus, while forward guidance is not entirely a sure way of 
predicting economic outcomes, it is an important tool for the central bank to convey 
reliable information about future monetary policy actions and influence market 
participants.  
                                                
6 Campbell, Jeffrey R., Charles L Evans, Jonas D.M. Fisher, and Alejandro Justiniano. "Macroeconomic 




After the financial crisis, Chodorow-Reich (2012) discovered a positive 
correlation between a direct credit supply to financial institutions and the employment for 
non-financial firms. The major institutional failures during the financial crisis, from the 
fall of assets of the Bear Stearns and BNP Paribas funds to the bankruptcy of Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, all resulted from exposure to real estate, mortgage 
securities, and funding structure. Following these market events, the Federal Reserve and 
federal government reacted with certain bailout policies. These policies included: an $85 
billion loan from the New York Federal Reserve Bank to the insurer AIG; the forced 
sales of the investment bank, Merrill Lynch and the commercial bank, Wachovia; and 
direct capital injections by the federal government into major financial institutions 
through the TARP. Chodorow-Reich argues that those relief efforts were necessary, 
because if banks did not have the ability to lend, financial and non-financial firms’ 
interest rates on loans would increase, and thus affect the employment at institutions. In 
his sample, he found that the withdrawal of credit accounts resulted in one-third to one-
half of the employment decline at small and medium sized firms in the year following the 
Lehman bankruptcy. In addition, Chodorow-Reich (2014) discovered how 
unconventional monetary policies helped to stabilize the financial sector and the 
economy after the financial crisis. In particular, Chodorow-Reich found that in the winter 
of 2008 to 2009 unconventional monetary policy was effective when it came to 
stabilizing financial institutions after the financial crisis.  It had a strong, stabilizing 
impact on banks and especially on life insurance companies. The results were consistent 
with the positive effects on legacy asset prices and future business. Chodorow- Reich 
states, “The positive effects on life insurers, in particular, suggest a recapitalizing channel 
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of monetary policy.” So, unconventional monetary was important in supplying financial 
institutions with liquidity.  
Although unconventional monetary policy was crucial in the initial downfall of 
the economy during the financial crisis, there are still some weaknesses to these policies. 
Some literature suggests that unconventional monetary policy seemed to have lost steam 
around 2010 to 2011. Putnam (2013) states that the Fed’s QE programs from 2011 
onward did little to nothing in assisting the U.S. economy. He found that economic 
growth remains constrained because there are long-lasting changes to risk preferences 
from the shock of the earlier financial panic. Due to those negative signals, it in turn 
affects economic confidence. For instance, the continuation of zero short-term interest 
rates, expansion of QE, and lower long-term rates can have a very depressing impact on 
certain demographics, in terms of their savings and consumption behavior, in the 
aftermath of a financial crisis.  
For example, many retirees and pension funds depend on fixed income 
investments as a source of income. Reducing rates paid on short-term and cash equivalent 
investments reduce individual’s income because of the lower expected returns from their 
retirement portfolio. This forces current and future retirees into a state of decreased 
consumption as a means to increase savings. In essence, zero short-term rate policies 
coupled with QE and lower long-term rates imply a redistribution of wealth away from 
savers and into the hands of borrowers. However, these borrowers, especially corporate 
borrowers, are not likely to expand their businesses during periods of heightened 
uncertainty, regardless of how low the interest rates may be. Putnam argues that the 
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sensitivity of the economy, during the post-crisis recovery phase, must be at the heart of 
any QE efficacy evaluation.  
In addition, Chodorow-Reich (2014) mentioned that the Fed is potentially losing 
its control over the policies that influence the economy, because some of the policies did 
not produce their intended result. One example of an unsuccessful unconventional 
monetary policy is the Maturity Extension Program, implemented after QE II. Ma (2013) 
explains that the Maturity Extension Program or “Operational Twist,” was intended to 
lower long-term interest rates. In this operation, the Fed sold short-term Treasury bonds 
and bought long-term Treasury bonds, which pressured the long-term bond yields 
downward and the short-term bond yields upward. Unlike QE, the Maturity Extension 
Program had no effect on the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, bank reserves, or the 
monetary base. This is because it is constrained in size by the amount of short-term 
securities the Fed holds. Operation Twist was intended to drive down long-term interest 
rates, so there would be more of an incentive for short-term investments, and most 
importantly no long-term risk to the central bank’s balance sheet.  Ma states, “In terms of 
unemployment, inflation rate reductions, and the promotion of economic growth, the 
effects of Operation Twist are not significant.” Based on Ma’s data, the results indicate 
that Operation Twist was ineffective at increasing short-term interests rates, thus not 
aiding in the boost of economic output.  
Furthermore, other literature suggests that there are big picture weaknesses to 
unconventional monetary policies. These faults are not only causing problems for the 
future economy, but are not addressing the current problem of debt overhang. Labonte 
(2014) argues that the sluggish rate of economic recovery raises questions about the 
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optimal approach to monetary policy. Labonte suggests that unconventional monetary 
policy alone is not powerful enough to return the economy to full employment after a 
severe financial crisis. What is particularly interesting about Labonte’s argument is that 
the Fed continued to pursue these policies in spite of modest improvements. Although the 
unemployment rate has been on a downward trajectory, the inflation rate has remained 
below the 2 percent target. These slow improvements raise concerns and long-term 
consequences arise, because unconventional policy has led to above-average growth in 
the money supply, which arguably poses a threat to price stability.  
In terms of interest rates, Labonte argues that it is less clear if QE has successfully 
executed the reductions of other private interest rates to thereby stimulate economic 
activity. That is because the spread between corporate and Treasury bonds remains 
greater than it was in the years before the crisis. Labonte states, “It should be noted that 
announcement effects measure what financial markets believe that QE will do to interest 
rates ex ante, and not what QE has done to interest rates ex post.” This indicates that 
lowering nominal interest rates are not actually causing a decrease in real interest rates. 
Labonte explains that $1 trillion in asset purchases only reduced long-term interest rates 
by a range of 0.25 percentage points to 1.72 percentage points. Another example of 
inefficiency is the QE goals of inducing spending and discouraging saving. One 
economic problem is when the economy is far below full employment, which has been 
the case since the financial crisis and there is not enough spending in the economy to 
utilize the economy’s productive capacity. If QE “worked,” the evidence would 
presumably be higher interest rates, higher inflation, or higher inflation expectations. 
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Labonte argues that overall, unconventional monetary policy results have not worked and 
the Fed should have looked for policies that did work. 
2.3 The Ties Between Debt Overhang and Unconventional Monetary Policy 
            Perhaps unconventional monetary policies were the wrong tools used to fix the 
economic problem. Wolf (2014) explains that there is a misconception of what type of 
crisis erupted in 2008. He states that there is a fallacy of misplaced concreteness. The 
central bank identified the financial crisis with old-fashioned bank runs by depositors, but 
such bank runs have become outdated because of deposit insurance. Wolf explains that 
by 2008, depository institutions were no longer the dominant form of financing. Instead, 
finance increasingly saw the prevalence of “shadow-banking.” These financial 
intermediaries involved in facilitating the creation of credit across the global financial 
system, yet they were not subject to regulatory oversight. The shadow banking systems 
are embedded in regulated institutions that participate in unregulated activities. So, after 
the financial crisis, businesses and households were exposed to debt, leaving the 
economy to the possibility of a self-reinforcing downward spiral. Thus, this crisis was not 
a crisis of confidence; but a crisis of indebtedness, as a result running more debt to ease 
consumer worries is not that effective in supporting Americans on their road to recovery 
from this debt hangover.  
For instance, Koo (2013) also emphasizes that the wrong policies were used 
during the wrong time. He explains that during a crisis, monetary policy is highlighted for 
profit maximization, and fiscal policy is necessary for debt minimization. Although 
interest rates were low and there was plenty of liquidity, private households were not 
interested in borrowing. For example, the U.S. private sector went from a net borrower of 
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funds with 5.3 percent of GDP in Q4 2008 to a net saver of funds with 8.4 percent of Q1 
GDP in 2010, despite the lowest interest rates in U.S. history. This stagnant or negative 
credit growth meant that the liquidity injected by the central banks could not enter the 
real economy to support private sector activities. Koo explains that indebtedness nullifies 
the efforts of unconventional monetary policy.  
Similarly, Friedman (2014) also criticizes unconventional monetary policy. 
Although unconventional monetary policy is a “fashionable tool,” it is not necessarily an 
effective one. He thinks that fiscal policy was not fully utilized and monetary policy was 
completely exhausted. He is concerned that central banks hold large amounts of assets 
because there has only been attention directed at short-term results of monetary policy. 
The long-term consequences have been forgotten about, like the consequence of running 
a high debt. In addition to this, central banks have massive liabilities on their balance 
sheet, which could cause serious issues and instabilities for the economy in the future. As 
a result, there could be long-term problems when it comes to unwinding unconventional 
monetary policy. For example, the economy is operating with a central bank’s balance 
sheet that is distorted and can potentially cause another recession. 
These long-term consequences are touched upon when Putnam (2013) discusses 
the other negative implications of unconventional monetary policy. Putnam explains that 
the Fed’s exit from QE is likely to be highly complex. He describes a number of 
problems; involving delays in returning to a more traditional short-term interest rate 
policy, dramatically diminished contributions to the U.S. Treasury from central bank net 
earnings, and the potentially large unrealized portfolio losses. For example, the Fed’s 
substantial amount of unrealized losses on its portfolio could exceed $62 billon paid-in 
 22 
and equity capital, making the Fed essentially insolvent.  In addition, over time as the 
U.S. Congress increases its oversight concerning the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, the 
Fed might lose some of their autonomy 
Krugman and Eggertsson (2012) also think that there will be difficulties when it 
comes to unwinding unconventional monetary policy, there will be a deleveraging shock, 
which will increase the confusion regarding policy implementation, more so than usual. 
They also discovered, when viewed through the lens of their model, many of the usual 
rules of macroeconomics become reversed, because the past recession was driven by 
debt. They use the term “paradox of toil” and “paradox of flexibility,” because 
unconventional monetary policy attempts to encourage Americans into consumption, but 
Americans want to save due to their debt. So while aggregate demand and supply is 
suppose to shift out, increasing output and prices, in actuality it can reduce output, and 
flexible wages can increase unemployment. This phenomenon studied indicates that wage 
and price flexibility do not facilitate recovery from recessions during a liquidity trap, but 
actually impair them. However, Krugman and Eggertsson explain that expansionary 
fiscal policy should be effective in combatting those impacts. Government spending 
would increase the price level and increasing aggregate supply. Thus fiscal expansion 
will be able to sustain output and employment while private balance sheets are repaired, 
and the government can pay down its own debt after the deleveraging period has come to 
an end. 
What is the significance of a financial crisis and debt overhang? They are both 
systemic and psychological repercussions of the risk that is debt. The OECD (2012) 
report made clear some of the problems with running a high debt. High debt can create 
 23 
vulnerabilities, exposing households, firms, and governments to solvency problems. 
Balance sheet vulnerabilities can also lead to self-fulfilling runs or sudden stops of 
normal economic output, and foreign capital flows could dry up. Moreover, when 
corporate and household debt is so high, a shock can induce forced cuts in investment, 
employment and consumption with negative implications for government revenues and 
spending. In addition, when asset prices move they can amplify shocks and 
macroeconomic instability.  
The OECD explains that the vulnerabilities created by debt, and the 
interconnections between sectors, can transcend across these sectors. Typically, debt 
builds up most rapidly in the private sector; therefore, when the economy enters a 
recession, private-sector debt as a share of GDP decelerates or declines, raising the risk of 
a recession and an economic crisis. The question arises as to how monetary and financial 
market policy should react to the buildup in debt. The recent crisis highlights just how 
costly and worrisome running a large debt can be. The OECD states, “The aim is to 
address households whose debt levels are clearly unsustainable, while maximizing 
returns to creditors by putting reasonable claims on debtors. In the United States, there 
are differences in the ability of borrowers to walk away from mortgages. Where this is 
possible, default rates on loans are higher.” Therefore, policies need to approach debt in a 
way that reduces or eliminates the debt entirely. Yet, to approach debt with a monetary or 
fiscal policy route depends on the situation and the type of debt.    
Boshara and Emmons (2013) discuss how the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009 
was damaging to household balance sheets. In particular, they examine the importance of 
sound financial footing to families at the micro-level and the importance of healthy 
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household balance sheets to the economy. For example, households with savings may 
have fewer day-to-day financial worries, allowing them to be more future-oriented in 
their economic and social decision-making. Conversely, the lack of savings and assets 
can hurt the future consumption and security of the family. Boshara and Emmons state, 
“Seventy percent of workers report withdrawing money from college and retirement 
accounts in order to make ends meet, and these withdrawals will likely lead to losses of 
wealth in future years.”7 These changes in household balance sheets, defined as wealth 
effects, have short-term and long-term repercussions on the economy. For instance, 
declining wealth in households decreases consumer spending, such that an unexpected 
decline of 1 percent in house prices results in about a 0.10 percent in permanent decline 
of consumer spending, while a 1 percent increase in house prices results in only about a 
0.03 percent increase in consumer spending.  
Therefore, when studying the Great Recession and the following weak recovery, 
Boshara and Emmons believe that negative household wealth effects played an important 
role. They consider the huge declines in asset values and net worth as one of the shocks 
that threw the economy into a recession. In addition, the liability side of household 
balance sheets could be detrimental to the economy in regards to default and 
deleveraging. In terms of default, the large concentration of excess debt can have 
negative implications to the economy. For example, in 2008 and 2009, real GDP fell 0.3 
and 3.1 percent, which was worse than predicted. This means that when it comes to 
deleveraging, households will be too concerned with paying down debt that they will 
                                                
7 Boshara, Ray, and William Emmons. "After the Fall, Rebuilding Family Balance Sheets, Rebuilding the 




increase their savings. As a result, when household debt becomes so large, they will 
choose to save over consume, and it will in turn suffocate economic growth. Boshara and 
Emmons suggest that policy responses involving debt restructuring can alleviate some of 
the burdens weighing heavily on the economy.  
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Paul Krugman saw a return of depression 
economics. Krugman (2009) explains more explicitly how recovery is bound to be a 
prolonged process. He states that the global credit system is in a state of paralysis and 
reform of the weakness that made the crisis is essential. However, two things need to 
occur for the economy to escape the recession. Firstly, credit needs to be flowing and 
secondly, spending needs to be stimulated. Credit has already been flowing, due to the 
Fed pumping liquidity into the economy, but to increase spending more needs to be done 
to stimulate individual consumption behavior. Krugman stresses the importance of very 
large fiscal stimuli: in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and autos, insisting that these 
responses are big enough to overwhelm systemic and psychological economic 
depression. 
2.3 Conclusions 
 The literature review explains how unconventional monetary policy made it 
possible for the Federal Reserve to further fuel the economy after conventional monetary 
policy was stuck in the zero-lower bound interest rate. Although unconventional 
monetary policy helped to stimulate GDP through lower interest rates and increased 
credit, there were no substantial effects in the real economy, because it is possible that the 
wrong policy tools were implemented for a misdiagnosed problem. Households are 
carrying large amounts of debt, and the Federal Reserve’s continuation of unconventional 
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monetary policy is not helping those households to revert back to the normal 
consumption and saving preferences. The next chapter will further discuss the 
implications of debt overhang, unconventional monetary policy and fiscal policy after the 


















Analytical Framework  
 The literature review explained how after the housing bubble burst and the stock 
market fell, the Federal Reserve used many facets of conventional and unconventional 
monetary policy to keep the economy afloat. The federal government even bailed out 
banks and offered relief packages. This chapter will try to explain that the problems of 
the financial crisis were misdiagnosed. It was not a crisis of confidence but rather a crisis 
of debt. This chapter will examine some of the foundational elements in understanding 
the relationship between debt overhang and unconventional monetary policy after the 
financial crisis. The first section, Wealth Effects, examines debt overhang, how it is 
measured and how it is impacted by the financial crisis. The second section, 
Unconventional Monetary Policy, looks at the risk and liabilities of the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet associated with unconventional monetary policy. Although these stresses 
on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet are intended to lower interest rates, decrease 
unemployment, and increase GDP; they can also have negative and long-term 
consequences to the balance sheet. The third section, Fiscal Policy, examines the policies 
enacted by the government and what the government could have done to accomplish 
more.   
3.1 Wealth Effects 
 Wealth effects are the change in spending, because of perceptions of wealth. People 
typically spend more overall when one of two things are true: when people are actually 
richer or when people perceive themselves to be richer. For example, when an 
individual’s income increases or when the assessed value of an individual’s home 
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appreciates, and the fiscal amount of their liabilities do not change, then this can result in 
an increase of an individual’s net worth. These changes in an economic agents’ wealth 
can lead to an increase in the amount of consumption. So, a household’s consumption is 
determined by its income (actual and expected), wealth, preferences, and its return on 
savings. Thus, the uncertainty faced by a household also plays a role in consumption, as 
does its ability to borrow.  
 Debt, on the other hand, does not typically exert an independent influence on 
consumption in traditional models. Yet, borrowing is presumed to vary with 
consumption, as the latter rises and falls in reaction to changes in its determinants. Debt 
overhang is a debt burden that is so great that an entity cannot take on additional debt to 
finance future projects. Krugman (1988) explains that debt overhang discourages future 
investment, since all earnings from new projects would have to go to existing debt 
holders, leaving little incentive for the investor to attempt to finance future projects. The 
crisis emerged during the early to mid-2000s where many people took advantage of rising 
home prices, easy credit conditions, and acquired large loans. After the financial crisis, 
the problems of debt were exposed due to the housing market bubble burst and people 
were eventually left with considerable debt overhangs.    
 The housing bubble was characterized by higher rates of household debt, lower 
savings rates, higher rates of home ownership, and of course, higher housing prices. 
Furthermore, it was fueled by low interest rates and large inflows of foreign funds that 
created easy credit conditions. Figure 2, highlights the appreciation of households, 
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reaching its peak in 2006. However, by 2008, household value declined by 20%.8 When 
the value of a home drops below the size of the mortgage, a borrower could have zero to 
negative equity. As a result, homeowners were left with few choices. They could be 
constrained to large mortgage payments for a house that is below the value of the 
mortgage, or a homeowner could walk away from their home, or opt for a foreclosure. 
Nevertheless, the latter two options also cause negative, long-term effects on their credit 
score, which could in turn affect their credit card debt. 
Figure 2: The Rise and Fall of Housing Prices 
  
Source: The Economist  
 When the house loses value and a homeowner’s mortgage is more than the value of 
the house, depending on the individual’s balance sheet, the homeowner goes into zero or 
negative equity. Table 2 shows an example of a homeowner’s balance sheet before the 
housing bubble burst, while Table 3 indicates that when the house value drops 29 percent, 
                                                
8 "A Helping Hand to Homeowners." The Economist. October 25, 2008. Accessed March 11, 2015. 
http://www.economist.com/node/12470547. 
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the homeowner’s net worth drops from $100,000 to $0. This has a dramatic impact on a 
consumer’s consumption and saving behavior. These tables illustrate debt overhang. Debt 
overhang is measured in one of two ways: a ratio of   !"#$!"#$%& or a ratio of  !"#  !""#$"!"#$%& . These 
fluctuations in an individual’s debt and net assets can severely reduce net worth. In 
addition, these changes to an individual or businesses’ balance sheet affect the spender’s 
consumption and saving behavior.  
Table 2: Homeowner’s Balance Sheet Pre-2006 (In Thousands of Dollars) 
    Assets  Liabilities   
House $350 Mortgage  $300 
Treasuries  $150 Credit Card  $50 
Checking Account $10 Car Loan $15 
Savings Account $15 Student Loan $85 
Art Collection $5   




 Total $550 Total  $450 
  




Table 3: Homeowner’s Balance Sheet After 2006 (In Thousands of Dollars) 
    Assets  Liabilities   
House $250 Mortgage  $300 
Treasuries  $150 Credit Card  $50 
Checking Account $10 Car Loan $15 
Savings Account $15 Student Loan $85 
Art Collection $5   




 Total $450 Total  $450 
  




 Dynan (2012) found highly leveraged households had larger declines in spending 
than their less leveraged counterparts, even though there were smaller changes in net 
worth. This suggests that their debt weighed on their consumption beyond what would 
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have been predicted by wealth effects alone. In addition, many households found 
themselves underwater due to the fact that their mortgages often came to exceed the value 
of their homes, and they had limited, if any, ability to borrow more money, refinance 
their mortgages, or sell their homes. In the face of such a financial shock to their net 
worth, it made it difficult for homeowners to make their (relatively high) mortgage 
payments. Dynan states: 
 Household’s mortgage leverage ratio of 10 percent is associated with a 
reduction in annual consumption growth of a few tenths of a percentage point. 
With the roughly half of Americans who have mortgages experiencing 
considerable jumps in leverage as a result of the roughly one-third decline in 
home prices nationwide, one might conclude that excessive leverage is having 
a noticeable (albeit modest) damping effect on aggregate consumption 
growth. 
 
Despite the efforts of the central bank and the government, important financial strains 
persisted. Dynan found that there was essentially no reduction of debt between 2009 and 
2011. The sample of homeowners reported that they were somewhat or very likely to 
have problems making their mortgage payments over the coming year. Furthermore, 
Dynan found that it might take many years for some households to reduce their leverage 
to pre-crisis norms. The effects of deleveraging on the economy could thus persist for 
some time to come. Dynan’s results reiterate how inhibiting it is for debtors to continue 
with normal consumption behavior, when they already have overhanging payments due 
to mortgage debt. 
 After the financial crisis, mortgage debt is still one of the largest contributors of 
debt for households. Figure 3 illustrates household debt as a ratio compared to disposable 
income. Although mortgage debt is a large composition of debt overhang, it is not the 
only type of debt. Other household debt includes personal, credit card, and student loan 
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debt. Figure 4 measures debt overhang in the United States. This chart shows household 
debt in terms of a percentage of the United States GDP. It also compares household debt 
to financial and nonfinancial corporate business debt. Both charts illustrate how debt has 
grown significantly since the financial crisis.  
Figure 3: Aggregate Ratio of Household Debt to Disposable Personal Income, 1980–2011Q4 
 
Source: Dynan (2012) calculations from Flow of Funds (Federal Reserve) data and National Income and 

















Figure 4: Growth of Debt Overhang in the US  
 
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve  
 
 Dynan (2012) also mentions when policymakers gauge whether additional fiscal 
and monetary stimulus is needed, they must understand how the still-elevated level of 
aggregate household leverage affects the underlying strength of the economy. Moreover, 
a better understanding of the implications of high leverage might shed light on the 
benefits of specific policy interventions. Dynan notes how some analysts have argued for 
improvements in programs that allow “underwater” borrowers to refinance, so that more 
households can benefit from the low mortgage rates that have resulted from 
accommodative monetary policy. Other analysts have advocated for reducing mortgage 
principal in order to revive the economy. The next two sections will highlight how 
monetary and fiscal policies are only getting at the surface of the true underlying 




3.2 Unconventional Monetary Policy 
 The Federal Reserve operates with a sizable balance sheet that includes a large 
number of distinct assets and liabilities. The Federal Reserve's balance sheet contains a 
great deal of information about the scale and scope of its operations. Over recent years, 
the development and implementation of a number of new lending facilities to address the 
financial crisis have increased the complexity of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. In 
the literature review, Krugman et al (2012) and Putnam (2013) suggest that there are 
long-term risks to the economy with such an unprecedented growth in the balance sheet.  
There are a number of factors affecting the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. On 
the asset side, there are both direct and indirect operations. In the current circumstances, 
direct factors include: holdings of Treasury, agency, mortgage-backed securities, discount 
window lending, lending to other institutions, assets of limited liability companies 
(LLCs) that have been consolidated onto the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, and foreign 
currency holdings associated with reciprocal currency arrangements with other central 
banks (foreign central bank liquidity swaps). For instance, after the financial crisis many 
depository institutions were short on liquidity. Thus, the Federal Reserve set discount 
window lending for eligible institutions to have access to primary credit, secondary 
credit, and seasonal credit, providing these institutions liquidity on a short-term basis 
with a low interest rate. In addition, the Federal Reserve’s largest component on the asset 
side of the balance sheet has been through the transactions of large-scale asset purchases 
of mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, and treasury securities by the various 
rounds of QE  
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One of the indirect factors that affect assets include the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York’s holdings of securities on behalf of foreign official and international 
institutions. Market participants often look for trends in these data to gauge foreign 
demand for U.S. Treasury and agency securities. Another indirect factor that affects 
assets includes the securities that the Federal Reserve lends from its portfolio of Treasury 
securities and federal agency debt securities to foster efficient and liquid trading in the 
market. When securities are lent, they continue to be listed as assets of the Federal 
Reserve because the Federal Reserve retains ownership of the securities. Figure 5a details 
the asset side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and Figure 5b highlights when QE 
was executed.  
 
                    Figure 5a: Selected Assets of the Federal Reserve 
 
 









Figure 5b: Selected Assets of the Federal and QE executions 
 
 Source: Federal Reserve  
 The graphs detail the changes the Federal Reserve balance sheet experienced during 
and after the financial crisis. For example, the level of securities held outright declined at 
the end of 2007 and into 2008. As the Federal Reserve sold Treasury securities to 
accommodate the increase in credit extended through liquidity facilities, the various 
liquidity facilities significantly slowed down over the course of 2009. The level of 
securities holdings has risen significantly since 2009, principally reflecting purchases of 
Treasury, agency, and agency-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities under QE 
announced by the FOMC.  
 There are many components on the liability side of the Federal Reserve balance 
sheet, as well. For instance, U.S. currency has historically been the largest liability for the 
Federal Reserve. The quantity of Federal Reserve notes held by the public has grown 
over time. The increase in Federal Reserve notes reduce the quantity of reserve balances 
held by depository institutions and push the federal funds rate above the target set by the 
FOMC. To prevent that outcome, the Federal Reserve engages in open market operations 
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to offset the reduction in reserve balances. 
 The Federal Reserve also conducts reverse repurchase agreements (reverse repos or 
RRPs) by selling Treasury securities and federal agency debt securities to counterparties 
who agree to sell them back to the Federal Reserve on a stated future date. During non-
recessionary periods, the Federal Reserve executes occasional reverse repos with primary 
dealers; these transactions temporarily reduce the supply of reserve balances and thus 
help bring the federal funds rate back up to the target set by the FOMC. During the fall of 
2008, the Federal Reserve executed a sequence of overnight reverse repos with primary 
dealers, as part of its response to the financial crisis. These transactions offset a modest 
amount of the reserve balance increase that resulted from the expansion of the Federal 
Reserve's liquidity facilities. Yet, an even more important effect of these transactions was 
to make more Treasury securities available to private agents so that they can use the 
securities as collateral in money market transactions and thereby improve the functioning 
of the money markets. 
 Deposits of depository institutions are borrowed or lent in bank funding markets, 
such as the federal funds market. Those transactions move funds from the lender's 
Federal Reserve account to the borrower's account, but do not change the total amount of 
balances that the banking system holds at the Federal Reserve Banks. Therefore, the 
deposits of depository institutions play a role in regards to open market operations. This 
is because the Fed decreases the sales of securities to decrease the level of deposits of 
depository institutions, so depository institutions will increase loans to investors and 
consumers. In times of crisis, the FOMC may set a lower federal funds rate target to spur 
greater economic activity. 
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 The federal funds rate is the central interest rate in the U.S. financial market. It 
influences other interest rates such as the prime rate, which is the rate banks charge their 
customers with higher credit ratings. Additionally, the federal funds rate indirectly 
influences longer-term interest rates such as mortgages, loans, and savings, all of which 
are very important to consumer wealth and confidence. In Figure 6, it shows how the 
Federal Reserve has targeted the federal funds rate to be close to zero since 2008.  
Figure 6: Federal Funds Rate (1970-2015) 
 
Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve 
 
 Figure 7a, details how since the Great Recession, the liabilities side of the balance 
sheet has grown significantly over time, especially with the amount of currency in 
circulation. Moreover, Figure 7b details when QE was executed.  











Figure 7a: Liabilities on the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet 
  
 




Figure 7b: Liabilities on the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet and QE executions 
Source: Federal Reserve   
 
 Although unconventional and conventional monetary policies have been exhausted, 
as Friedman (2014) and Krugman et al (2012) have expressed, there are concerns with 
these large financial pressures on the balance sheet of the central banks. Krugman and 
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Eggertsson (2012) in particular notice that the current economic conditions of low 
interest rates and low inflation will be problematic for macroeconomic management 
when it comes time to unwind unconventional monetary policy. Based on Krugman and 
Eggertsson (2012) study, they use Fisher, Minsky, and Koo analysis to explain how three 
problems could occur. According to Fisher (1933), deflation could occur and Minsky 
(1986) states that debt will keep rising for private individuals. As a result of debt and 
deflation, a balance sheet recession could occur, because such a distress on balance sheets 
will prevent individual spending due to debt. They argue that if a slump is to be avoided, 
the government should spend more to compensate for the fact that debtors are spending 
less; yet even a zero nominal interest rate may not be low enough to induce the needed 
spending, so fiscal policy must be used.  
3.3 Fiscal Policy  
  
 While the central bank acted as a “lender of last resort,” the Federal government 
bailed out some banks and implemented policies to balance the distressed economy. The 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, sometimes referred to as the bailout of 
the U.S. financial system, was a law enacted in response to the subprime mortgage crisis, 
authorizing the United States Secretary of the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion on 
distressed assets, especially mortgage-backed securities, and to supply cash directly to the 
banks.  
 Within this policy was the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a program that 
purchases distressed assets as an additional way to inject capital into banks and other 
financial institutions, while the Treasury continued to examine the usefulness of targeted 
asset purchases. An important goal of TARP was to encourage banks to resume lending 
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again at levels seen before the crisis, both to each other and to consumers and businesses. 
As banks gain increased lending confidence, the interbank lending interest rates (the rates 
at which the banks lend to each other on a short term basis) should decrease, further 
facilitating lending. If TARP can stabilize bank capital ratios, it should theoretically 
allow them to increase lending, as opposed to saving cash, to mitigate future unforeseen 
losses from troubled assets. The government hoped that the increased lending would 
equate to “loosening” of credit, ultimately to restore order in the financial markets and 
improve investor confidence in financial institutions and the markets.  
 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act also provided additional benefits to 
individuals. Those benefits provided the alternative minimum tax (AMT) relief, energy 
tax credits, and disaster relief for individuals. It also extended the availability of the 
exclusion from gross income of discharges of qualifying mortgage debt and several other 
provisions affecting individuals that expired at the end of 2007 or were scheduled to 
expire at the end of 2009.9 
 Critics of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act point to two issues: moral 
hazard and the increased deficit for the U.S. government. Moral hazard occurs when one 
party takes on more risks because someone else bears the burden of those risks. Moral 
hazard also arises when the party with more information about its actions or intentions 
has a tendency or incentive to behave inappropriately from the perspective of the party 
with less information. Neil Barofsky, special inspector general for TARP, states that 
TARP largely spared, “Executives, shareholders, creditors and counter parties, 
                                                
9 Cohen, Gary N., and Todd A. Richardson. "Effects of Emergency Economic Stabilization Act Provisions 




reinforcing that not only would the government bail out the largest institutions, but would 
do so in a manner that would do little harm to the responsible stakeholders.”10 Barofsky 
states that TARP and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act perpetuate the legacy of 
“Too Big to Fail”. Although, moral hazard has been a negative externality of this 
legislation, for the purposes of this paper, this subject will not be investigated any further. 
Instead, this paper will focus on the importance of federal government intervention and 
the issues of the federal bailout cutting into the federal deficit.  
In February 2009, Congress also passed the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act. This legislation is commonly referred to as the “stimulus” or the 
“stimulus package.” The goals of this act were to create new jobs and save existing ones, 
encourage economic activity and invest in long-term growth, as well as to promote 
unprecedented levels of accountability and transparency in government spending. These 
goals were going to be accomplished by tax cuts and benefits for millions of working 
families and businesses, funding for entitlement programs, like unemployment benefits, 
and funding for federal contracts, grants and loans. Spending estimates for the act were 
approximately $787 billion, but in 2011, the expenditure was raised to $840 billion. 
Paul Krugman argues that there was not enough stimulus or government money 
spent on the bailout. He explains that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 
“…was too small and too short-lived given the depth of the slump: stimulus spending 
peaked at 1.6 percent of GDP in early 2010 and dropped rapidly thereafter, giving way to 
a regime of destructive fiscal austerity. And the administration’s efforts to help 
                                                




homeowners were so ineffectual as to be risible.”11 The Recovery Act never reached that 
level of spending; even if tax cuts of dubious effectiveness were included, it only briefly 
grazed that target in 2010, before rapidly fading away. Krugman also argues that even 
TARP did not cost enough money. 
 As a result, Krugman is highly critical of politicians for not pumping more money 
into the Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Krugman is specifically critical of Timothy 
Geithner’s position on the stimulus. Geithner states, “$800 billion over two years was 
considered extraordinarily aggressive, twice as much as a group of 387 mostly left-
leaning economists had just recommended in a public letter.” Krugman claims that he and 
other economists argued that the package was actually too small. The economists’ letter 
called for spending amounts of $300 to $400 billion per year. The Recovery Act never 
reached that level of spending; it only briefly grazed that target in 2010, before fading 
away.   
So why is there is a discrepancy between too much government money and not 
enough? That is because economists are looking at structural deficit compared to the 
current budget. The U.S.’s current budget deficit fluctuates sharply due to economic 
conditions, while structural budget deficit is the difference between government spending 
and revenues when the economy is stable. The cyclical deficit, like spending money on 
economic recovery, will take care of itself as the economy recovers. Instead, the 
government should only concentrate on long-term pressures on the structural budget 
deficit. For example, spending on unemployment insurance is highly cyclical, whereas 
spending on veterans’ health care and Social Security payments are mostly structural. 
                                                
11 Krugman, Paul. "Does He Pass the Test?" The New York Review of Books. July 10, 2014. 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jul/10/geithner-does-he-pass-test/. 
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The ideal solution would be to organize a reduction of the structural deficit over a decade 
through increases in tax revenue and cuts to spending. Figure 8 illustrates the difference 
between actual deficit and structural deficit. According to this data, the structural deficit 
is roughly 2 percent of GDP. The structural deficit indicates that larger amounts of 
stimulus spending would have been attainable for the U.S. government during the 
financial crisis.  
Figure 8: Structural Deficit v. Actual Deficit 
 
Source: Evan Soltas Complied data from Congressional Budget Office  
  
Conclusion 
 Although, monetary and fiscal policy was expanded to help the economy, the Great 
Recession, was not a crisis of confidence, but a crisis of debt. At banks, federal deposit 
insurance assures depositors that they will not lose their money, preventing bank runs. 
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Lehman Brothers, raise money through various forms of short-run borrowing eventually 
found themselves suffering from banks runs- yet, the actions of the Federal Reserve and 
the government were able to stabilize financial markets. However, the issue of debt 
overhang is still lingering in the economy. After the financial crisis, households were left 
with large mortgage debt and other personal debt. The only way to stimulate real wages, 
consumer spending and GDP is through debt relief and fiscal stimulus. With the 
continuation of unconventional monetary policy pumping through the economy, these 
low interest rates and low prices could possibly raise the risk for deflation, more debt, or 



















Empirical Analysis  
 This next section analyzes the relationship between debt overhang and 
unconventional monetary, and whether unconventional monetary policy is effective in 
dealing with debt overhang. As touched upon earlier, unconventional monetary policy 
lowers interest rates and provides liquidity to financial institutions, stimulating GDP. The 
first section, Graphical Analysis, is a foundation for the following subsections. These 
graphs detail the components of GDP and the relationship to interest rates, before and 
after the financial crisis. The second section, Interest Rate Channel, examines whether 
the decreased interest rates significantly affected consumption and investment. The third 
section, Credit Channel, studies if the Federal Reserve’s expansion of the balance sheet 
significantly affected consumption and investment. The final section, Interpretation, 
examines the big picture meaning of the regression results. Although, unconventional 
monetary policy provides liquidity to financial institutions and creates a low interest rate 
environment to stimulate consumption and investment, debt overhang also affects 
consumption and investment, which can morph the environment that the Federal Reserve 
is trying to create. Thus, debt overhang is significantly affecting consumption and 
investment.  
4.1 Graphical Analysis      
 This section looks at the big picture changes of how consumption, net assets as a 
percentage of disposable income, and investment were affected before and after the 
financial crisis. With these representation established, the next two sections examine how 
unconventional monetary policy’s interest rate and credit channel increases consumption 
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and investment. The data used for this analysis was collected from the Federal Reserve’s 
database. The quarterly data was collected from 1990 to 2014, to encompass not only the 
Great Recession, but also non-recessionary periods in the U.S. economy. 
The reason why it is important to be concerned with consumption and investment 
is that they are the largest components of GDP. The expenditure equation for GDP is: 𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑋 −𝑀  
From this equation the economy can be broken down as such: where Y is GDP; C 
is consumption the largest component of the economy including household final 
consumption expenditures, like goods and services; the second largest component is I, or 
investment of businesses into physical capital, such as building a new building;  
 G is government spending; (X-M) is net exports. Figure 9a highlights how much 
consumption and investments make up GDP.  
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Since consumption and investments are the largest component of GDP, it will be 
beneficial for this analysis to see the effects of consumption and investment before and 
after the financial crisis, and to see if the inverse relationship remains between interest 
rate, consumption and investment. Figure 9a also illustrates how the Great Recession 
affected GDP and its constituents. Since 1990, there has been constant growth, but when 
the financial crisis hit in Q4 of 2007 it negatively influenced GDP, consumption, and 
investment. From 2008 to 2009: GDP fell -1.53 percent, C fell -0.97 percent and I fell -
9.31 percent. In the regression analysis sections, the dependent variables will be 
investment and consumption of durable goods, because these variables are sensitive to 
low interest rate and an abundant credit environment. Figure 9b, highlights how the 
financial crisis impacted investment more than consumption of durable goods.  














It is also important to examine how consumption is affected by individual balance 
sheets. For instance, when an individual has more net assets they are more likely to 
consume durable goods like cars or other big-ticket items, while businesses make 
investments into their homes or businesses. Figure 10 details net assets as a percentage of 
disposable income. It is interesting to note that right before the housing bubble burst in 
2006, net assets as a percentage of disposable income was at its height of 651 percent of 
disposable income and then it fell to 506 percent in Q1 of 2009, falling 22 percent or an 
average of    -6.85 percent a year. This indicates that not only did individual’s net worth 
fall, but also their debt grew. In addition, this graph shows that net assets have not 
returned to the level it was at in its zenith from 2006 to 2007. The data also indicates that 
net assets as a percentage of disposable income has fallen on average of -3.36 percent 
from 2012 to 2014. For the regression analysis, this data will be used as a variable of debt 
overhang.  
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 Although the graphs seen thus far highlight how consumption, investment and 
individual balance sheets were affected after the financial crisis, but how does that affirm 
whether unconventional monetary policy was effective or not? Well in previous chapters, 
it was explained that unconventional monetary policy is supposed to lower interest rates 
to ultimately stimulate investment and consumption, particularly consumption of durable 
goods. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show how there is an inverse relationship between 
interest rates and investments, where lower interest rates creates an environment where 
individuals or businesses are more apt to take out loans and invest in physical capital. 
Figures 13 and 14 assess the correlation between investment and interest rates.  
 Figure 11 is a graph of real total investment versus the prime rate. Again real total 
investment is the total investments in the economy that businesses invest into physical 
capital. The prime rate is the base rate that banks use to set the price or interest rate on 
many of their commercial loans and some of their consumer loan products. Economic 
theory explains that as interest rates decrease investments should increase. Case in point, 
between 2000 and 2004, where the prime rate decreased on average -9.70 percent and 
real total investment increased on average 4.66 percent. However, this theory was not 
significant during the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 as the prime rate dropped to          








Figure 11: Real Total Investment vs. Prime Rate  
 
 
Figure 12 shows a similar relationship between real total investment and the 10-
year Treasury rates. The 10-year rates are closely tied to long-term interest rates, as a 
result we can see if the investment and interest rate relationship is significant in the long 
run. Figure 12 shows a similar relationship as shown in Figure 11, for instance between 
2007 and 2009, when the 10 year interest rate fell -11.79 percent and investments also 
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Figure 12: Real Total Investment v. 10 year  
 
Although both graphs show how investment increased after 2008, the inverse 
relationships are not that significant after the financial crisis. Figure 13a is a scatter graph 
of real investment and the 10 year treasury rate between 1990 Q1 to 2007 Q3, right 
before the Great Recession, and the graph shows a significant relationship between low 
interest rates stimulate higher levels of investment, and higher interest rates lower the 
levels of investment. However, Figure 13b shows the relationship after the financial crisis 
from 2007 Q4 to 2014 Q14, and the graph is less significant. There is not a strong 
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Figure 13a: Investment v. 10 year (‘90 Q1- ‘07Q3)   Figure 13b: Investment v. 10 year (‘07Q4- ‘14Q4)  
            
Figure 14a: Investment v. r (‘90Q1- ‘07Q3)                       Figure 14b: Investment v. r (‘90Q1- ‘07Q3) 
 
       
 
To reinforce this argument, a scatter plot was designed to show the relationship 
between real investments and real interest rates. Real interest rates are the interest rates 
that have been adjusted to remove the effects of inflation to reflect the real cost of funds 
to the borrower, and the real yield to the lender. The real interest rates or (r) is calculated 
by using the Fisher equation, which states that the real interest rate is approximately the 








































inflation rate. Figure 14a shows the strong inverse relationship between real investment 
and real interest rates between 1990Q1 and 2007Q3. Similarly to Figure 13b, Figure 14b 
also shows how this relationship falls apart. Although, this is not a definitive explanation 
that unconventional monetary policy is ineffective, it does suggest that unconventional 
monetary, a policy that lowers interest rates, does not have a strong correlation in 
increasing investments after the financial crisis. As a result, there must be other factors 
affecting this relationship, so the next two subsections will delve into the significance of 
these other variables.  
4.2 Interest Rate Channel  
Although the scatter plots and graphs give a good physical representation of what is 
going on, through regression analysis there is a better understanding of the significance of 
unconventional monetary policy. The interest channel examines how monetary policy 
changes nominal interest rates and price level, subsequently affecting output and 
employment. According to times of recession, a decline in the long-term real interest 
rates reduces both the cost of borrowing and the money paid on interest-bearing deposits. 
Therefore, the low interest rate environment encourages household spending on durable 
goods, as well as increased investing by investors. The rise in investments and durable 
goods purchased, boosts the level of aggregate demand and employment. Krishnamurthy 
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) investigated how quantitative easing affects various 
interest rates and the impact of macroeconomic behavior. They argued that QE signals a 
decrease in nominal interest rates, an increase in inflation expectations, and a decrease in 
corporate bond default risk. As a result encouraging market participants to invest and 
consume.  
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 In examining real investment, there will also be a comparison to consumption of 
durable. Therefore, the first regression is to examine the relationship between real 
investment and real interest rates. In a low interest rate environment, it is assumed that 
businesses would be more apt to invest in certain aspects of their enterprise, like taking 
out a loan to expand their building, to buy new equipment, etc. Thus, it is expected that 
there would be a significant relationship between real investment and real interest rates. 
The equation below measures investment as the dependent variable compared to real 
interest rates, the change in GDP and net asset as a percentage of disposable income. The 
equation: 𝐼 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10+ 𝛽!Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽!𝑁𝐴𝑃𝐶 
 
Table 4 shows that real interest rates and net assets as a percentage of disposable income 
are significant, whereas the change in GDP is not that significant. Although the results 
intuitively make sense, where real interest rates inversely effect investment and net assets 
directly affect investment, it does not pass the Durbin Watson test. The results indicate 
that the coefficients are inflated because of autocorrelation. 
Table 4: Investment and Interest Rate  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -930.3883 349.9830 -2.658381 0.0093 
REAL10 -381.8874 19.18133 -19.90933 0.0000 
D(GDP) 0.359773 0.318187 1.130695 0.2612 
NAPC 8.549687 0.595321 14.36147 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.919812    Mean dependent var 2759.731 
Adjusted R-squared 0.917168    S.D. dependent var 808.3797 
S.E. of regression 232.6554    Akaike info criterion 13.77819 
Sum squared resid 4925698.    Schwarz criterion 13.88572 
Log likelihood -650.4639    Hannan-Quinn criter. 13.82164 
F-statistic 347.9446    Durbin-Watson stat 0.584033 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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For comparison, it would be compelling to compare Table 4 to the consumption 
of durable goods and interest rate relationship. For example, if individuals were in an 
environment of low interest rates, they might be more responsive to buying a home, a car, 
or a washing machine. Therefore, Table 5 compares consumption of durable goods to real 
interest rates, a change in GDP, and net assets as a percentage of disposable income:  𝐶𝑂𝐷 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10+ 𝛽!Δ𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽!𝑁𝐴𝑃𝐶 
 
These results are also strong, the coefficients are statistically significant and the R-
squared close to one. Although, the regression does not pass the Durbin Watson test, the 
other components of these results are significant.  
Table 5: Consumption of Durable Goods and Interest Rates 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 413.4468 165.0440 2.505070 0.0150 
REAL10 -160.4460 11.71812 -13.69213 0.0000 
D(GDP) 0.264363 0.133509 1.980118 0.0524 
NAPC 1.578512 0.293096 5.385648 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.769867    Mean dependent var 1031.570 
Adjusted R-squared 0.758165    S.D. dependent var 189.0894 
S.E. of regression 92.98800    Akaike info criterion 11.96420 
Sum squared resid 510159.4    Schwarz criterion 12.10028 
Log likelihood -372.8725    Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.01772 
F-statistic 65.79100    Durbin-Watson stat 0.495417 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
 Appendix C uses variations of the regressions in Table 4 and Table 5 to resolve 
autocorrelation. Autocorrelation occurs for a variety of reasons, there could not enough 
dependent variables in the equation, perhaps the wrong model is being used, or there is a 
time series difference in the data. However, using methods such as lag effect for interest 
rates, first-order autoregressive process, and logarithmic functions could help correct this 
error. As seen in Appendix C, the significance of the coefficients were worse when the 
adjustments for autocorrelation was taken into account, so Table 4 and Table 5 are the 
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most significant results. For the next subsection, Appendix D will also examine the 
problem of autocorrelation  
These regressions shown in Table 4 and Table 5 indicate that real interest 
stimulates investment and consumption of durable goods. It is also important to note that 
net assets as a percentage of disposable income, the indicator of debt overhang, are also 
statistically significant on investment and consumption of durable goods. Although 
unconventional monetary policy created a low interest rate environment to increase 
investment and consumption, it is important to note that wealth effects are statistically 
significant to these outputs. As a result, unconventional monetary policy alone cannot 
stimulate consumption and investment behavior  
 
4.2 Credit Channel 
 
The credit channel of monetary policy transmission is an indirect amplification 
that works with the interest rate channel. The credit channel affects the economy by 
altering the amount of access credit firms and/or households have to these funds. After 
the financial crisis, it was important for central banks to create liquidity for financial 
institutions. The Federal Reserve increases the availability of credit, and thus increases 
agents’ spending and investment behavior, leading to an increase in output. Chodorow-
Reich (2012) explains that credit matters because it not only allows interest rates to 
remain low for loans, but Chodorow-Reich also found that lender health has an 
economically and statistically significant effect on employment. If credit is contracted 
from businesses, due to financial institutions’ lack of liquidity, it will negatively 
influence employment at non-financial firms.  
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As a result, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet has been exceedingly expanded 
due to unconventional monetary policy to stimulate the economy and to provide credit to 
financial institutions. The assets and liabilities are a good measurement of unconventional 
monetary policy, but another measurement of unconventional monetary policy that is 
beneficial for this channel of analysis, is the monetary base. Monetary base is the portion 
of the commercial banks’ reserves with the central bank, plus the total currency 
circulating in the public and held at banks. An increase of the monetary base, like the one 
after the financial crisis, will typically result in a much larger increase in the supply and 
demand of deposits through the banks’ loan making or the money multiplier. As a result, 
banks will be more likely to give out loans, stimulating consumption and investment. 
With this much liquidity at financial institutions, there should be a significant relationship 
between consumption and investment, and the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and 
monetary base. 
However, Hubbard (1995) explains two ways in which having credit is not 
enough to stimulate investment and consumption. For instance, if financial institutions 
have credit available through open market operations, it does not mean they will lend it 
out to borrowers. Especially after an economic crisis, banks are potentially more reluctant 
due to the risk and cost of lending. Secondly, an individual’s economic situation affects 
their accessibility to credit or their willingness to take out credit. For example, an adverse 
shock to a borrower’s net worth increases the cost of external finance and decreases the 
ability of the borrower to implement investment, employment and production plans. 
Hubbard states, “Developing ways to incorporate borrower heterogeneity in both 
economic models of money and credit and in forecasting is an important, practical task 
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for economic modelers and policymakers.”12 As a result, the regressions will examine if 
unconventional monetary policy, in terms of increasing credit, will positively stimulate 
consumption and investment.  
 Table 6 and Table 7 represent real investment in relation to monetary base and 
real investment compared to the assets and liabilities of the central bank’s balance sheet. 
Table 6 measures investment based on real interest rates, net assets as a percentage of 
disposable income and monetary base. The real interest rate coefficient should be 
negative, while net assets and monetary base should be a positive coefficient: 𝐼 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10+ 𝛽!napc+ 𝛽!𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 
 
Although the regression does not pass the Durbin Watson test, the coefficients are 
statistically significant and the R-squared is almost at one; Appendix D shows other 
regressions that compensate for autocorrelation, but Table 6 is the most statistically 
significant result.   
Table 6: Investment and Monetary Base  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1543.522 360.2564 -4.284510 0.0000 
REAL10 -316.2719 26.56963 -11.90351 0.0000 
NAPC 9.140154 0.552323 16.54857 0.0000 
MOBASE 0.000130 4.28E-05 3.035369 0.0031 
     
     R-squared 0.927388    Mean dependent var 2746.732 
Adjusted R-squared 0.925020    S.D. dependent var 814.1376 
S.E. of regression 222.9306    Akaike info criterion 13.69237 
Sum squared resid 4572219.    Schwarz criterion 13.79922 
Log likelihood -653.2338    Hannan-Quinn criter. 13.73556 
F-statistic 391.6700    Durbin-Watson stat 0.531529 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
  
                                                
12 Hubbard, R. Glenn. "Is There a “Credit Channel” for Monetary Policy?" National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1994. http://www.nber.org/papers/w4977.pdf. 
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 Table 7 is a regression model that measures real investment to the balance sheet 
of the Federal Reserve. The regression measures real investment to real interest rates, net 
assets as a percentage of disposable income, and the Federal Reserve’s assets and 
liabilities. Real interest rates and the liability coefficient should be negative, while net 
assets and the assets coefficient should be a positive coefficient. 
log(𝐼) = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10+ 𝛽!log  (napc)+ 𝛽!𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏 
Table 7: Investment and the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.810199 0.340306 5.319327 0.0000 
REAL10 -0.047867 0.005997 -7.981975 0.0000 
LOG(NAPC) 1.002670 0.053030 18.90768 0.0000 
BASS 5.89E-07 5.95E-07 0.990232 0.3282 
LIAB -5.78E-07 6.03E-07 -0.959227 0.3434 
     
     R-squared 0.910078    Mean dependent var 8.148250 
Adjusted R-squared 0.900855    S.D. dependent var 0.078966 
S.E. of regression 0.024864    Akaike info criterion -4.444116 
Sum squared resid 0.024111    Schwarz criterion -4.241367 
Log likelihood 102.7706    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.368927 
F-statistic 98.67694    Durbin-Watson stat 1.374793 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      This regression comes close to passing the Durbin Watson test, where interest 
rates and net assets are statistically significant, but the coefficient for the Federal 
Reserve’s assets and liabilities are not statistically significant. This could be because the 
Federal Reserve balance sheet is a representative of so many facets of unconventional 
monetary policy that these variables could not be statistically significant compared to real 
investment or there are not enough variables in this model. The only significant 
coefficients are net assets as a percentage of disposable income and real interest rates. 
These results reiterate the results in the interest rate channel, that individuals balance 
sheet are important to investment.  
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 Table 8a, 8b, and 9 will makes similar comparisons as that in Table 6 and Table 7, 
but the dependent variable is consumption of durable goods. Table 8a measures the 
regression of consumption of durable goods based on real interest rates, net assets as a 
percentage of disposable income and monetary base. Real interest rates coefficient should 
be negative, while net assets and monetary base should be a positive coefficient. 𝐶𝑂𝐷 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10+ 𝛽!NAPC+ 𝛽!𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 
 
 Table 8a highlights that the variables fit the regression line and the coefficients 
are statistically significant except for 𝛽!, yet the results are still inflated because of the 
Durbin Watson Test.  
Table 8a: Consumption and Monetary Base   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 151.5658 112.3416 1.349151 0.1824 
REAL10 -97.78705 10.40803 -9.395350 0.0000 
NAPC 1.630358 0.194948 8.363026 0.0000 
MOBASE 9.00E-05 1.05E-05 8.607608 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.891201    Mean dependent var 1031.570 
Adjusted R-squared 0.885669    S.D. dependent var 189.0894 
S.E. of regression 63.93668    Akaike info criterion 11.21505 
Sum squared resid 241186.0    Schwarz criterion 11.35112 
Log likelihood -349.2741    Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.26857 
F-statistic 161.0943    Durbin-Watson stat 0.477981 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 Although, additional tables of the regression are kept in Appendix D and Table 8b 
real interest rates and 𝛽! are not significant, however this table highlights how this 







Table 8b: Consumption and Monetary Base with AR(1)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 214921.8 31231707 0.006882 0.9945 
REAL10 0.431007 6.608931 0.065216 0.9482 
NAPC 0.616587 0.166299 3.707691 0.0005 
MOBASE -7.41E-05 2.41E-05 -3.077367 0.0032 
AR(1) 0.999925 0.010975 91.11322 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.990351    Mean dependent var 1037.498 
Adjusted R-squared 0.989674    S.D. dependent var 184.6357 
S.E. of regression 18.76181    Akaike info criterion 8.778731 
Sum squared resid 20064.31    Schwarz criterion 8.950274 
Log likelihood -267.1407    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.846083 
F-statistic 1462.653    Durbin-Watson stat 2.133624 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       1.00   
     
       
 Table 9 represents the strongest results from this regression analysis.  The 
equation examines the connection of consumption of durable goods dependent on real 
interest rates, net assets as a percentage of disposable income, assets and liabilities  𝐶𝑂𝐷 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10+ 𝛽!napc+ 𝛽!𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏 
 
 Table 9 shows that the coefficients are statistically significant and that there is a 
strong R-square, furthermore, the equation almost passes the Durbin Watson Test. 
Consumption of durable goods in relation the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet is more 
significant than Table 8a and Table 8b. Table 9 results are also more interesting than 
Table 6 and Table 7, indicating that consumption of durable goods are more sensitive to 
the credit available at financial institutions than investment. However, overall both 
investment and consumption of durable goods are responsive to net assets as a percentage 
of disposable income. Similar to the interest rate channel results, the Federal Reserve 
actions of for creating liquidity are statistically significant factors for stimulating 
consumption and investment, but the coefficients are so small that they do not directly 
impact consumption and investment.  
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Table 9: Consumption and The Federal Reserve Balance Sheet   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.298319 0.322793 4.022143 0.0002 
REAL10 -0.035979 0.005965 -6.031458 0.0000 
LOG(NAPC) 0.871198 0.050325 17.31149 0.0000 
BASS 4.40E-06 5.55E-07 7.916443 0.0000 
LIAB -4.37E-06 5.61E-07 -7.784759 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.955690    Mean dependent var 7.012826 
Adjusted R-squared 0.951470    S.D. dependent var 0.114033 
S.E. of regression 0.025121    Akaike info criterion -4.429932 
Sum squared resid 0.026505    Schwarz criterion -4.233108 
Log likelihood 109.1034    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.355866 
F-statistic 226.4654    Durbin-Watson stat 1.159489 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
4.3 Interpretation   
 
 What is the significance of these results? In the presence of unconventional 
monetary policy, the low interest rate environment increases consumption and 
investment; while the actual changes in the central bank’s balance sheet are statistically 
significant do not directly impact consumption and investment. Ultimately, these results 
in essence address the core concept of debt overhang. All of these tables show that the 
coefficient for NAPC (net assets as a percentage of disposable income) is positive and 
significant. Before explaining these results further, it is also important to point out that 
some of these diagnostics are questionable and some of the other coefficients (like real 
interest rate and monetary base) signs change. These inefficiencies are explained due to 
auto correlation inadequacies in the data. For instance, the Durbin Watson is not passed 
in the results, although Appendix C and D try to accommodate for this error, it was 
difficult to fix autocorrelation. This means that the t-statistics of the results are 
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overestimated, and hence a regression that appears to be significant may not be so. The 
estimated variances of the parameters could be biased and inconsistent.13  
 However, the results of NAPC are robust with respect to all model specifications. 
For example, Table 9 details these results and provides explanations for the thesis. For 
instance, all else equal controlling for real interest rates, a one-unit decrease in the 
interest rate, increases the consumption of durable goods by 36 billion dollars. In 
addition, when NAPC increase by 1%, consumption of durable goods increases by 
0.87%. To further suggest how important net assets are to consumption is to exam the 
financial crisis period from 2007 to 2008, where net asset fell 20 percent and from the 
result indicated in Table 9 would correlate to a decreased consumption of durable goods 
by 17 percent. This highlights the phenomenon of debt overhang after the financial crisis 
and those impacts on consumption. Yet, the changes of the Federal Reserve’s balance 
sheet have no major, direct affect on consumption of durable goods. In regards to the 
assets of the Federal Reserve’s balance, a one-unit increase in the assets on the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet only increases consumption of durable goods by 4,400 dollars. 
These results indicate that unconventional monetary policy in regards to the change of the 
central bank balance sheet are not as significant as compared to net assets and real 
interest rates.  
 As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, consumption and investment are 
large components of GDP, roughly 80 percent. Figure 9b illustrates how from 2007 to 
2008, investment declined more than consumption of durable goods. To study this 
further, Table 10 and Table 11 compares investment and consumption of durable goods 
                                                
13 Ramanathan, Ramu. "Chapter 9: Serial Correlation." In Introductory Econometrics with Applications, 
380-383. 5th ed. San Diego, California: South-Western, 1989. 
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to unconventional monetary policy, interest rates, and GDP. The equation for Table 10 is 
shown as:  𝐼 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10+ 𝛽!NAPC+ 𝛽!𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽!𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 
 
Table 10: Investment, Monetary Base, and GDP 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1600.114 385.3060 -4.152840 0.0001 
REAL10 -302.5576 28.28824 -10.69553 0.0000 
NAPC(-1) 9.058846 0.588100 15.40359 0.0000 
D(GDP(-1)) 0.533947 0.302495 1.765145 0.0810 
MOBASE 0.000170 4.32E-05 3.946068 0.0002 
     
     R-squared 0.930955    Mean dependent var 2773.376 
Adjusted R-squared 0.927852    S.D. dependent var 801.6392 
S.E. of regression 215.3238    Akaike info criterion 13.63389 
Sum squared resid 4126426.    Schwarz criterion 13.76917 
Log likelihood -635.7927    Hannan-Quinn criter. 13.68853 
F-statistic 300.0028    Durbin-Watson stat 0.526929 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
The equation for Table 11:  
 𝐶𝑂𝐷 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙10+ 𝛽!NAPC+ 𝛽!𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽!𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 
 
Table 11: Consumption of Durable Goods, Monetary Base, and GDP 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 184.9961 119.5947 1.546859 0.1272 
REAL10 -96.75884 11.06712 -8.742914 0.0000 
NAPC(-1) 1.549217 0.203583 7.609759 0.0000 
D(GDP(-1)) 0.097632 0.095421 1.023165 0.3104 
MOBASE 9.40E-05 1.06E-05 8.897238 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.895901    Mean dependent var 1038.225 
Adjusted R-squared 0.888844    S.D. dependent var 194.9921 
S.E. of regression 65.01054    Akaike info criterion 11.26188 
Sum squared resid 249355.8    Schwarz criterion 11.43054 
Log likelihood -355.3802    Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.32832 
F-statistic 126.9425    Durbin-Watson stat 0.557258 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
These results, although adjusted for autocorrelation, are still slightly inflated due 
to failing the Durbin Watson test. However, the results show something very interesting, 
that the coefficients of the independent variables for investments are larger and more 
 66 
statistically significant than the coefficients of the independent variables for consumption 
of durable goods. For example in Table 10, all else equal, a one-unit decrease in the 
interest rate increases investment by 302.56 billion dollars. Moreover, all else equal, a 
one-unit increase in NAPC increases investment by 9.06 billion dollars. Conversely, 
Table 11 shows that, all else equal, a one-unit decrease in real interest rates increases 
consumption of durable goods by 96.76 billion dollars, and a one unit increase in NAPC 
increases consumption of durable goods by 1.55 billon dollars. The results show that 
investors are more concerned with GDP and NAPC. As a result, when a crisis hits not 
every aspect of the economy is not equally affected. Thus, debt overhang affects various 


























 The focus of this study was intended to examine whether or not unconventional 
monetary policy was effective in combatting debt overhang. Over the course of this 
analysis, the results indicate that unconventional monetary policy was effective in 
stimulating consumption and investment behavior. Yet, the results also indicate that debt 
overhang is statistically significant to the other effects of output, in particular investment 
and consumption of durable goods.  
 This paper examines a very nuanced relationship, while there has been plenty of 
literature about unconventional monetary policy and debt overhang, this relationship has 
never been examined closely. Bernanke (2004) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) maintain that unconventional monetary was an important facet of the 
recovery of the U.S. economy to stabilize the economy and increase consumption and 
investment; which to some degree was necessary, so the economy would not react like it 
did during the Great Depression. However, many economists as Labonte (2014) and 
Friedman (2014) explain that it has been a slow recovery for the economy and it will 
continue to be slow to return to the level it was at in 2007. Krugman and Eggertsson 
(2014) claim that because of debt spreading after the financial crisis, it has morphed the 
expected macroeconomic outcomes of monetary policy and creating a slow economic 
recovery. Furthermore, Boshara and Emmons (2013) explain that because individual’s 
net worth have been negatively impacted from the financial crisis, and that some 
consumers are not being able to consume and invest because of the debt overhang, which 
slows down the growth of the economy.  
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Although there are some shortcomings to this analysis; such as the simplicity of 
the regression, the autocorrelation of the data, however, the contribution of this paper 
shows debt overhang has a significant impact on investment and consumption behavior. 
Indicating that unconventional monetary policy alone does not reduce the significance of 
debt overhang. As a result, it is important that the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Federal 
Government reexamine the alternative avenues to stimulate consumption and investment, 
possibly through fiscal stimulus, debt forgiveness or restructuring of mortgages.  
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Calculations for pages 51-52 
 
	  	   Average	  Annual	  Rates,	  Per	  Year	   	  	  
	  	   C	   I	   GDP	   NAPC	  
2008-­‐2009	   -­‐0.97%	   -­‐9.31%	   -­‐1.53%	   -­‐10.18%	  
2007-­‐2009	   0.10%	   -­‐6.16%	   -­‐0.43%	   -­‐6.85%	  
2012-­‐2014	   2.24%	   7.34%	   2.32%	   -­‐3.36%	  
 
 
Calculations for pages 53-54 
 
	  	   Average	  Annual	  Rates,	  Per	  Year	  
	  	   Prime	  Rate	   10	  Year	  Bond	   I	  	  
2000-­‐2004	   -­‐9.70%	   -­‐4.88%	   4.66%	  


















I. Investment Regressions and Interest Rate Channel  
  
Table C.1 results to do not make equation more statistically significant, also GDP 
should not be a negative coefficient 
 
Table C.1 is accounting for lag in real interest rates  
Dependent Variable: I   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/05/15   Time: 20:17   
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q2 2013Q4  
Included observations: 95 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1026.098 375.4151 -2.733235 0.0075 
REAL10(-1) -369.0486 20.29296 -18.18604 0.0000 
D(GDP) -0.138656 0.335467 -0.413324 0.6803 
NAPC 8.746378 0.637524 13.71929 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.907329    Mean dependent var 2759.731 
Adjusted R-squared 0.904274    S.D. dependent var 808.3797 
S.E. of regression 250.1091    Akaike info criterion 13.92286 
Sum squared resid 5692464.    Schwarz criterion 14.03040 
Log likelihood -657.3361    Hannan-Quinn criter. 13.96632 
F-statistic 296.9912    Durbin-Watson stat 0.552947 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
 Table C.2 results also do make it more significant, actually, it is less than Table 4. 
 
Table C.2 log application 
Dependent Variable: LOG(I)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/05/15   Time: 20:22   
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q2 2013Q4  
Included observations: 95 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -4.130426 1.078618 -3.829368 0.0002 
REAL10 -0.150142 0.009641 -15.57295 0.0000 
D(GDP) 0.000189 0.000159 1.188434 0.2378 
LOG(NAPC) 1.965737 0.169480 11.59867 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.880373    Mean dependent var 7.873105 
Adjusted R-squared 0.876430    S.D. dependent var 0.330507 
S.E. of regression 0.116182    Akaike info criterion -1.426130 
Sum squared resid 1.228335    Schwarz criterion -1.318598 
Log likelihood 71.74115    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.382679 
F-statistic 223.2332    Durbin-Watson stat 0.388107 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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II. Consumption of Durable Goods and Interest Rate Channel   
 
 Coefficients are not correct, real10 should be negative, and real10 and GDP are 
not significant.  
 
Table C.3 AR(1) 
Dependent Variable: COD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/04/15   Time: 11:51   
Sample (adjusted): 1999Q2 2014Q1  
Included observations: 60 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1366.149 749.1513 1.823595 0.0736 
REAL10 0.185832 7.178688 0.025887 0.9794 
D(GDP) 0.019056 0.026033 0.732017 0.4673 
NAPC 0.636073 0.179989 3.533946 0.0008 
AR(1) 0.984683 0.015031 65.50927 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.987731    Mean dependent var 1024.883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.986839    S.D. dependent var 173.8413 
S.E. of regression 19.94351    Akaike info criterion 8.903340 
Sum squared resid 21875.91    Schwarz criterion 9.077869 
Log likelihood -262.1002    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.971608 
F-statistic 1106.964    Durbin-Watson stat 2.309896 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .98   
     
      
Table C.4 Lag of interest rates  
Dependent Variable: COD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/05/15   Time: 20:31   
Sample: 1999Q1 2014Q1   
Included observations: 61   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 525.4170 172.6648 3.042988 0.0035 
REAL10(-1) -146.5692 12.21830 -11.99588 0.0000 
D(GDP) 0.049408 0.139423 0.354375 0.7244 
NAPC 1.361296 0.307640 4.424971 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.724323    Mean dependent var 1018.967 
Adjusted R-squared 0.709814    S.D. dependent var 178.4717 
S.E. of regression 96.14085    Akaike info criterion 12.03283 
Sum squared resid 526854.6    Schwarz criterion 12.17125 
Log likelihood -363.0013    Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.08708 
F-statistic 49.92122    Durbin-Watson stat 0.436474 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 




Table C.5 Log 
Dependent Variable: LOG(COD)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/05/15   Time: 20:34   
Sample: 1999Q1 2014Q1   
Included observations: 61   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.970724 1.124908 1.751898 0.0852 
REAL10 -0.158067 0.012508 -12.63764 0.0000 
D(GDP) 0.000191 0.000141 1.355140 0.1807 
LOG(NAPC) 0.824769 0.178152 4.629566 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.743071    Mean dependent var 6.910585 
Adjusted R-squared 0.729548    S.D. dependent var 0.183020 
S.E. of regression 0.095179    Akaike info criterion -1.802783 
Sum squared resid 0.516369    Schwarz criterion -1.664365 
Log likelihood 58.98488    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.748536 
F-statistic 54.95041    Durbin-Watson stat 0.451434 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     





















I. Investment Regressions and Credit Channel  
 
Table D.1 Investment with lag effect 
Dependent Variable: I   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/05/15   Time: 23:17   
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q2 2013Q4  
Included observations: 95 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1523.019 397.3898 -3.832556 0.0002 
REAL10(-1) -307.0104 29.51114 -10.40320 0.0000 
NAPC 9.072288 0.602535 15.05687 0.0000 
MOBASE 0.000134 4.73E-05 2.828528 0.0058 
     
     R-squared 0.914659    Mean dependent var 2759.731 
Adjusted R-squared 0.911845    S.D. dependent var 808.3797 
S.E. of regression 240.0151    Akaike info criterion 13.84047 
Sum squared resid 5242260.    Schwarz criterion 13.94801 
Log likelihood -653.4225    Hannan-Quinn criter. 13.88392 
F-statistic 325.1017    Durbin-Watson stat 0.504915 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
Table D.2 Investment with AR(1) 
Dependent Variable: I   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/05/15   Time: 23:21   
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q2 2013Q4  
Included observations: 95 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1964.968 2948.950 -0.666328 0.5069 
REAL10 6.963761 11.96681 0.581923 0.5621 
NAPC 1.283207 0.353061 3.634524 0.0005 
MOBASE -0.000249 5.70E-05 -4.365735 0.0000 
AR(1) 1.007924 0.005533 182.1560 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.996862    Mean dependent var 2759.731 
Adjusted R-squared 0.996722    S.D. dependent var 808.3797 
S.E. of regression 46.28193    Akaike info criterion 10.55858 
Sum squared resid 192781.5    Schwarz criterion 10.69299 
Log likelihood -496.5324    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.61289 
F-statistic 7146.784    Durbin-Watson stat 1.124294 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       1.01   
 Estimated AR process is nonstationary 
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Table D.3  with lag effect 
Dependent Variable: I   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/05/15   Time: 23:51   
Sample (adjusted): 2003Q1 2013Q4  
Included observations: 44 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 198.8614 242.3812 0.820449 0.4169 
REAL10(-1) -140.2782 24.99530 -5.612184 0.0000 
NAPC 5.770472 0.373050 15.46837 0.0000 
BASS 0.002086 0.002441 0.854459 0.3981 
LIAB -0.002037 0.002472 -0.824060 0.4149 
     
     R-squared 0.870990    Mean dependent var 3467.783 
Adjusted R-squared 0.857758    S.D. dependent var 270.3990 
S.E. of regression 101.9809    Akaike info criterion 12.19409 
Sum squared resid 405604.2    Schwarz criterion 12.39684 
Log likelihood -263.2700    Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.26928 
F-statistic 65.82548    Durbin-Watson stat 0.841897 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
II. Consumption of Durable Goods and Credit Channel  
 
Table D.4 With Lag Effect 
Dependent Variable: COD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/06/15   Time: 00:09   
Sample (adjusted): 1999Q1 2014Q3  
Included observations: 63 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 193.1596 121.8385 1.585374 0.1182 
REAL10(-1) -92.04028 11.23837 -8.189825 0.0000 
NAPC 1.536232 0.209020 7.349695 0.0000 
MOBASE 9.32E-05 1.13E-05 8.219896 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.872906    Mean dependent var 1031.570 
Adjusted R-squared 0.866444    S.D. dependent var 189.0894 
S.E. of regression 69.10343    Akaike info criterion 11.37047 
Sum squared resid 281741.8    Schwarz criterion 11.50654 
Log likelihood -354.1699    Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.42399 
F-statistic 135.0744    Durbin-Watson stat 0.417901 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     










Table D.5 with log adjustments  
Dependent Variable: LOG(COD)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/06/15   Time: 00:20   
Sample (adjusted): 1999Q1 2014Q3  
Included observations: 63 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.362798 0.857595 1.589093 0.1174 
REAL10 -0.110152 0.012501 -8.811299 0.0000 
LOG(NAPC) 0.891562 0.135789 6.565766 0.0000 
MOBASE 7.43E-08 1.25E-08 5.927803 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.845280    Mean dependent var 6.921535 
Adjusted R-squared 0.837412    S.D. dependent var 0.190093 
S.E. of regression 0.076650    Akaike info criterion -2.237760 
Sum squared resid 0.346634    Schwarz criterion -2.101688 
Log likelihood 74.48945    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.184242 
F-statistic 107.4443    Durbin-Watson stat 0.392190 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
Table D.6 Raw 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -13.97489 67.04291 -0.208447 0.8359 
REAL10 -39.85792 7.169353 -5.559486 0.0000 
NAPC 1.642414 0.104071 15.78169 0.0000 
BASS 0.003822 0.000666 5.741073 0.0000 
LIAB -0.003775 0.000673 -5.611973 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.950689    Mean dependent var 1117.957 
Adjusted R-squared 0.945992    S.D. dependent var 129.8753 
S.E. of regression 30.18243    Akaike info criterion 9.752685 
Sum squared resid 38261.13    Schwarz criterion 9.949509 
Log likelihood -224.1881    Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.826752 
F-statistic 202.4328    Durbin-Watson stat 1.013279 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
















Table D.7 with Lag  
Dependent Variable: COD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/06/15   Time: 00:23   
Sample (adjusted): 2003Q1 2014Q3  
Included observations: 47 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -12.16797 72.79750 -0.167148 0.8681 
REAL10(-1) -34.73243 7.765801 -4.472484 0.0001 
NAPC 1.618963 0.112476 14.39384 0.0000 
BASS 0.003872 0.000722 5.365290 0.0000 
LIAB -0.003823 0.000729 -5.243325 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.942016    Mean dependent var 1117.957 
Adjusted R-squared 0.936494    S.D. dependent var 129.8753 
S.E. of regression 32.72915    Akaike info criterion 9.914697 
Sum squared resid 44990.29    Schwarz criterion 10.11152 
Log likelihood -227.9954    Hannan-Quinn criter. 9.988764 
F-statistic 170.5846    Durbin-Watson stat 0.753782 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
D.7 With AR(1)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/06/15   Time: 00:25   
Sample (adjusted): 2003Q2 2014Q3  
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 21 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 388.0076 283.3564 1.369327 0.1785 
REAL10 3.814052 6.841688 0.557472 0.5803 
NAPC 0.547013 0.188432 2.902968 0.0060 
BASS -0.000996 0.002145 -0.464082 0.6451 
LIAB 0.000926 0.002144 0.432007 0.6681 
AR(1) 1.031384 0.014834 69.52615 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.983229    Mean dependent var 1123.463 
Adjusted R-squared 0.981133    S.D. dependent var 125.6429 
S.E. of regression 17.25807    Akaike info criterion 8.655545 
Sum squared resid 11913.64    Schwarz criterion 8.894063 
Log likelihood -193.0775    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.744895 
F-statistic 469.0165    Durbin-Watson stat 2.308736 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       1.03   
 Estimated AR process is nonstationary 
     
      
 
 
 
 
